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Abstract In the present techno-political moment it is clear that ignoring or dis-
missing the hype surrounding blockchain is unwise, and certainly for regulatory 
authorities and governments who must keep a grip on the technology and those pro-
moting it, in order to ensure democratic accountability and regulatory legitimacy 
within the blockchain ecosystem and beyond. Blockchain is telling (and showing) 
us something very important about the evolution of capital and neoliberal economic 
reason, and the likely impact in the near future on forms and patterns of work, social 
organization, and, crucially, on communities and individuals who lack influence 
over the technologies and data that increasingly shape and control their lives. In this 
short essay I introduce some of the problems in the regulation of blockchain and 
offer counter-narratives aimed at cutting through the hype fuelling the ascendency 
of this most contemporary of technologies.
Keywords Blockchain · Data · Neoliberalism · Regulation · Technology
Introduction
Part of what Manuel Castells called the rise of network society (Castells 2010), as 
well as falling within the scope of notions of ubiquitous or pervasive computing and 
ambient intelligence promoted by the likes of IBM in the latter part of the twenti-
eth century (Wright et al. 2006, pp. 7–9), distributed ledger technology (DLT), or 
as it is popularly known blockchain, is impacting and in many cases transforming 
thought and practice in information and communication technology and beyond. 
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For example, the technology is viewed by some stakeholders as necessary in order 
to address, once and for all, the problematic of inefficient and ineffective systemic 
and institutional intermediation, otherwise known as the middleman. In this essay I 
argue that blockchain needs to be taken seriously from the point of view of regula-
tion, and briefly introduce some regulatory themes for consideration.1 First, how-
ever, what makes the emergence of blockchain technology within the contemporary 
politico-economic landscape not only a viable but a crucial target of critique?
Believing the Hype
A Financial Times report on the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in 
January 2018 carried the headline ‘blockchain can no longer be ignored’ (Arnold 
2018). Whilst focus on blockchain by economic elites in Davos arguably stems from 
perceived and potential threats to legacy financial control and power, which cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin but also blockchain are said to represent by influen-
tial stakeholders in the blockchain ecosystem (Swan 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott 
2016; Masters 2016), there is far more to the unfolding story of so-called blockchain 
‘disruption’. Hype surrounding the technology has been building significantly dur-
ing the past three or four  years based largely on the notion (and applied techno-
logical potential) of blockchain infrastructure as severable from and therefore not 
reliant on the problematic world of digital currencies.2 On that basis the gradual 
entry of blockchain into mainstream commercial consciousness has largely signalled 
a retreat and an uncoupling from anarchic libertarian aspirations harboured by those 
who first conceived of it.3 As a consequence the technology is no longer a threat to 
legacy financial power but yet another opportunity to be exploited by it. Put another 
way, blockchain offers myriad ‘possible paths to improve system efficiency and scal-
ability’ that are attractive technological ‘solutions’ to global financial power, but that 
requires changing current models, which has strong implications for the centraliza-
tion of a technology rooted in a decentralizing ethos (Aste et al. 2017, p. 26).
Interest in blockchain at Davos has shown (and for some time prior) that legacy 
financial power can easily absorb ‘disruptive’ technologies into existing paradigms 
and thus not be disrupted by them at all. Blockchain, it is believed, will enable sys-
tems of trade and finance to become more effective and efficient by supporting and 
1 For a more detailed examination of the themes introduced in this essay, see: Herian (forthcoming).
2 A 2015 edition of The Economist that focused on blockchain as ‘The Trust Machine’ was arguably a 
key moment in the mainstreaming of the technology, as well as development of the idea that blockchain 
could do more than simply serve the purposes of those interested in trading and using cryptocurrencies 
such as Bitcoin.
3 The result of this libertarian retreat, however, which began with Satoshi Nakamoto’s claim in the now 
infamous White Paper that something akin to what is now called blockchain technology would enable 
individuals to transact online without ‘going through financial institutions’ (Nakamoto 2008, p. 1), does 
not automatically signal stronger democratic oversight by centralized governments. Rather, and in accord 
with the neoliberal tradition, it signals government and governance in the corporate commercial mould, 
summed up in Melanie Swan’s vision of blockchain-led governance being ‘services as individualized as 
Starbucks coffee orders’ (Swan 2015, p. 46).
1 3
Taking Blockchain Seriously 
realising (making viable and invisible) the advanced stages of global mass data han-
dling and frictionless transfers of value—what Lana Swartz calls ‘infrastructural 
care work’ (Swartz 2017, p. 102)—thus transforming society and industry alike 
(Swan 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott 2016; Aste et al. 2017). The blockchain horizon 
is one in which more capitalism and with it the further and deeper entrenchment of 
capitalist class power are likely outcomes based on the present course of blockchain 
research, development and implementations. This is perhaps unsurprising however 
as blockchain is self-evidently a capitalist organizational form, or more specifically, 
to refer to capital’s contemporary ‘mutant form’, a neoliberal one (Han 2017, p. 
5). Where various national governments have begun to take blockchain seriously, 
including in the UK with the recent formation of an All Party Parliamentary Group 
(APPG) on blockchain, discussions tend to begin with advantages for entrepreneurs 
and investors, and favour commercial business applications first and foremost, with 
broader social benefits that the technology might herald remaining lower order 
considerations.4
Amid the bluster of rampant innovationism that engenders the present socio-
political moment, technologies such as blockchain have a guaranteed place in 
changes (whether subtle or sweeping) made to social structures, systems and insti-
tutions. ‘Blockchain is more than a technology’, Eva Kaili, Chair of the European 
Parliament’s science and technology panel, has enthusiastically claimed, ‘it is an 
infrastructure upon which we can build wider applications such as the Internet of 
Things, smart cities and infrastructures’ (Singh 2017). Decentralization of state sov-
ereignty and power in favour of coded and technological formations of economic 
and consumerist subjectivities, of dividuated data governance, to echo Deleuze 
(Deleuze 1995, p. 182), and underscored by neoliberal accusations ‘that govern-
ments inevitably promote inefficient models of economic administration’ (Stiegler 
2010, p. 101), is setting new precedents for the management of individuals as de-
politicized, machine readable data auras. The present lack of or reluctance toward 
critical regulatory oversight threatens to result in an exclusive commercial dictate 
with little or no democratic or government accountability. On this basis it is impera-
tive that critique questions, as it has done in relation to the growth of the Internet, 
mobile technologies and big data; what is (and will be) at stake from blockchain’s 
continuing embeddedness in economic logic and reason; and to consider what other 
options might exist to benefit and empower community over self-interest.
Political Assumptions
Ian Bogost says of Bitcoin that it is a technology that seems to be ‘from an alien civ-
ilization’ (Bogost 2017). More importantly, however, he acknowledges that in order 
to understand it—and blockchain forms part of this consideration—‘first requires 
4 This perspective is drawn from the author’s own experience as a contributing member of the UK’s 
APPG blockchain group, which first convened on 30 January 2018. The UK government, prior to this, 
had explored blockchain in-depth in only one report by the Chief Scientific Advisor (Walport 2016).
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deciphering the political assumptions that inspire it’ (Bogost 2017). Whether viewed 
as a database, network or distributed ledger, blockchain is much more to its pro-
moters and acolytes than mere code or a computational tool for time-stamping data 
records and transactions.5 Likewise, to the uninitiated layperson increasingly hear-
ing and seeing news reports on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, there is more to 
the technology than mere computation. There is, it might be said based on events 
at the close of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, a certain thrill accompanying the 
possibility of great wealth as the value of a single Bitcoin hovers around $10,000; 
or, equally, dismay at scandals and vulgar opportunism accompanying the digital 
gold-rush.
Cryptocurrencies and blockchain enfold a range of potentialities and promises, as 
well as threats and harms to the social. It is incumbent upon regulators, and govern-
ments more broadly, to maintain a grip on the extent of the social and political reach 
the technology has, and not abdicate that responsibility to chaotic entrepreneurs and 
private commercial entities intent on ‘making up sets of rules’ and engaging in ‘free-
lance governance’ (Gupta 2017). Decentralization of legacy forms of power and the 
radical reimaging of paradigms of trust, transparency and even democracy, all make 
blockchain politically determinative. Moreover, blockchain is a striking moment, if 
not precisely a unique phenomenon, within the long durée of technology with capi-
talism.6 This is an important truth that needs to be maintained before the technology 
is allowed to sink into the mire of everyday economic logic, reason and practice and 
thus become invisible as another piece in the jigsaw of neoliberal common sense.
Blockchain critique is important at this moment because the technology remains 
undefined in the wider public consciousness and therefore its politics are not set. 
This point is important because blockchain’s legitimacy and authority does not, I 
argue, derive from technological credentials, but from being a (relatively) novel 
lens through which to view the world undertaking a fourth industrial revolution and 
the potential to order and control people, institutions, systems and networks in that 
world. In an interesting and wonderfully cynical article, Kai Stinchcombe asks why 
nobody has found a use for blockchain in the 10 years of its existence (Stinchcombe 
2017). He suggests this is due to the fact that multiple technologies already exist that 
are able to do what people would like, for whatever reason, to see blockchain doing. 
In short, blockchain is simply not needed. Whilst Stinchcombe’s article raises some 
interesting points, it misses a key one: blockchain produces greater effects as an idea 
than an applied technology. Blockchain is a powerful cultural and political product 
that has emerged from turbulent conditions post-financial crisis and it derives legiti-
macy and authority from promises of inter alia radical transparency that are tanta-
lizing yet rightly brought into question (Han 2015; Pasquale 2015).
6 Alexander Galloway makes similar arguments around the material effects of protocol, what he defines 
as ‘the standards governing the implementation of specific technologies […] a technique for achieving 
voluntary regulation within a contingent environment’ (Galloway 2004, p. 7).
5 Time-stamping documents and recording them on a digital ledger is a basic way in which to describe 
the function of a blockchain, and relates to an earlier system developed in the late 1980s of which today’s 
ledgers are the progenitor: see, for example, Haber and Stornetta (1991).
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A Regulatory Conundrum
In The Regulatory Enterprise, Tony Prosser proposes two regulatory visions at once 
in dialogue and polar opposition—although he does acknowledge that a great deal 
of light and shade generally constitute regulatory environments and space (Prosser 
2010, p. 4). There is a ‘major distinction’, claims Prosser, ‘between regulation as 
infringement of private autonomy and regulation as a collaborative enterprise’ 
(Prosser 2010, p. 4), and this, I suggest, lies at the heart of the blockchain regulatory 
conundrum.7 For present purposes the former can be said to accord with a vision of 
the blockchain ecosystem and conduct based in market-complementing regulation, 
economic efficiency and self-interest, and what Prosser further refers to as ‘regula-
tion for economic efficiency and consumer choice’ (Prosser 2010, p. 18); the lat-
ter to social or distributive concerns, community and generosity (Cohen 2011, pp. 
217–219), or what Prosser aligns to ‘regulation for social solidarity’ and ‘regulation 
as deliberation’ (Prosser 2010, p. 18). A fourth regulatory framework highlight by 
Prosser concerns the protection of rights (Prosser 2010, p. 18); regulation therefore 
rooted in domestic and trans-national legislative frameworks, as well as international 
law and treaties, which do not necessarily favour either the polarity of markets and 
self-interest or community and generosity unless predisposed to do so by law.
The current task of understanding what regulating blockchain means or ought to 
mean is occurring against a backdrop of continuing struggles to achieve meaningful 
and stable regulation and governance over commercial platforms, within networks, 
and in consideration of interoperability and the broader architecture of the Internet. 
The questions, problems and so on that blockchain brings to the fore are therefore 
not easily abstracted from many of the concerns that continue to plague regulation 
of Internet-based networks and systems. Shortcomings in Internet regulation remain 
stubbornly apparent some 30 years into the mass adoption of the technology (Brown 
and Marsden 2013; Mueller 2013; Pasquale 2015; Srnicek 2017) and the how’s and 
why’s of blockchain regulation now form part of, but have also arguably intensified, 
the regulatory conundrum. There are a number of reasons for this claim, but the 
one of most interest here concerns the co-evolution of technology and economy and, 
importantly, the cultural and political ramifications of this and how regulatory envi-
ronments, enterprise and rationale address them. If, for example, it is true that the 
7 This distinction is made more apparent when the nature of different blockchains is taken into consid-
eration. Namely, permissioned ledgers, which, as the name suggests, are designed for use on closed, pri-
vate systems by those with the requisite permissions (e.g. to create ‘transparent’ and ‘immutable’ infor-
mation and data audit trails within the confines of a global corporation); in contrast to permission-less 
ledgers like the Bitcoin blockchain which maintain a public character and are therefore more open to 
scrutiny. A great deal of research, development and subsequent discussion surrounding actual use-cases 
for blockchain technology has now moved onto the role of permissioned ledgers for back-office functions 
in, for example, banking systems. The irony of this, given the initial libertarian (i.e. avoidance of finan-
cial institutions) aspirations the technology was said to engender, is unmistakable. As David Golumbia 
remarks, this irony is symptomatic of ‘a reassertion of the political power that the blockchain is specifi-
cally constructed to dismantle’ (Golumbia 2016, p. 76; see also, Herian 2016, 2018). Moreover, as Lana 
Swartz has argued, the ‘incorporative blockchain’ of back-office functions is no longer pursuing the liber-
tarian dream of holistically remaking society, but is, in fact, quite ‘boring’ (Swartz 2017, p. 96).
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‘economy is an expression of its technologies’ (Arthur 2009, p. 193), it is equally 
so, I claim, that technologies are the expression of economic will, and the present 
blockchain moment is both illustrative and symptomatic of the latter.
The emergence of blockchain ‘disruption’ within the contemporary political and 
economic moment calls to mind Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruc-
tion (Schumpeter 2010). In the hands of quasi-libertarian, self-interested and, what 
Vinay Gupta (2017) has called, ‘chaotic’ entrepreneurs, this creative destruction has 
led, in the main, to myriad attempts at re-imagining (not disrupting) legacy financial 
systems over the last decade using cryptocurrencies. The desire now is to repeat the 
process in an array of non-currency based, normatively civic arenas such as e-vot-
ing, land registries and health records (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016). In practice this 
means growth in blockchain-based private public partnerships, or to put it another 
way, privatization of forms of public administration that puts them beyond direct 
democratic accountability (private corporate actors not being publicly elected offi-
cials), whilst amplifying the role of regulators ill-prepared for the task of dealing 
with high levels of bluster and noise emanating from the blockchain ecosystem As 
such, this also entails the so-called ‘wait and see’ or the somewhat more proactive 
‘wait and monitor’ approaches to regulation adopted by the likes of the European 
Commission (Singh 2017).
Attempts by entrepreneurs to leverage personal, self-interested gains, through the 
re-imaging of various legacy systems, are occurring at the fuzzy edges of transna-
tional regulatory understanding and lead to the threat of what I am calling regula-
tory disorientation. This means regulators are facing informational overload and that 
‘wait and see’ or ‘wait and monitor’ approaches are mere euphemisms for a lack of 
motivation or energy across the regulatory environment whose focus on ‘centralized 
actors in a decentralized ecosystem will not be able to keep pace’ (Reyes 2016, p. 
221). Jurisdictions have as a consequence reacted at different speeds; some slow, 
others with more urgency, especially in the case of cryptocurrency regulation, which 
has included in some cases outright bans on the trading and possibly also on the use 
of cryptocurrency.8 But as yet the majority of jurisdictions have said little and done 
less to define or impose limits on either blockchain, its ecosystem or the conduct it 
produces. This ‘wait and see’ approach, it would appear, signals a longer term pro-
ject; a fact that is not necessarily unwelcome if that means serious critical scrutiny 
of the technology is undertaken (Walch 2017, p. 14).
Where it is a problem, however, is twofold: firstly, where the wait and see policy 
is beholden to innovationism or creates a vacuum that innovationism quickly fills, 
often made clear by calls from entrepreneurs and other stakeholders for government 
not to stifle innovation;9 secondly, in allowing the lag between law, regulation and 
9 The European Commission is illustrative again here, where both Eva Kaili and German EPP group 
MEP, Jacob von Weizsäcker, have backed regulatory approaches that do not ‘regulate too early, so as to 
avoid stifling innovation’ (Singh 2017).
8 The UK and EU are both presently considering the need to regulate cryptocurrency in order to address 
problems of anonymity apropos money laundering and tax evasion. Other nations, South Korea for 
instance, are also planning to ban cryptocurrency trading for the same reasons. See for example: Kollewe 
(2017).
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governance, and blockchain to grow in the interim. In both problems, which largely 
intersect, it is possible to recognise a repeat of the shortcomings and mistakes of 
Internet regulation, which have led to the hegemony of big data business and the 
mass commercialisation of cyberspace on the one hand, and a parallel ungovernable 
‘dark-net’ on the other. Mueller (2017) reinforces this point, whilst also simultane-
ously celebrating innovation and highlighting failures in Internet regulation and gov-
ernance. ‘It has become a cliché’, says Mueller, ‘to note that the “unified and unfrag-
mented space” created by the victory of the Internet protocols was filled not only 
with innovative economic and social activity, but also with the crimes and conflicts 
that accompany human interactions in every other space’ [emphasis added] (Muel-
ler 2017, p. 11). Thus, Mueller concludes, ‘[a]long with the innovations, efficien-
cies, and creative new forms of entertainment and interaction came thieves, bullies, 
fraudsters, child abusers, spies, vandals’ (Mueller 2017, p. 11).
Whilst blockchain may not be considered a particularly risky technology in terms 
of potential threats or harms it poses to individuals or communities—compare this 
with, for example, cautionary tales surrounding ‘the malign aspect of technology’ 
(Arthur 2009, p. 215) including perceived threats from bioengineering, artificial 
intelligence and nanotechnologies (Brownsword 2008)—this does not mean that no 
threats or harms exist, but instead manifest in other, more subtle ways. There are 
for instance conceivable threats and harms posed by the blockchain ecosystem in 
further entrenching and disseminating neoliberal ideology for instance. For neolib-
eral stakeholders, but equally those who are simply complaisant about ill-effects of 
social and political control wrought by ‘free-market’ economics, this is unlikely to 
sound like a threat at all. For this class of stakeholder blockchain remains, for the 
better, ‘an institutional technology to decentralize the governance structures used to 
coordinate people and economic decision making’ (Aste et al. 2017). If, however, 
neoliberal ideology is grounded in what Stuart Hall called the anachronism of ‘the 
free, possessive individual, with state cast as tyrannical and oppressive’, whereby 
the state ‘must not intervene in the “natural” mechanisms of the free market, or take 
as its objective the amelioration of free-market capitalism’s propensity to create ine-
quality’ (Hall 2017, p. 318), then what is at stake in the regulatory decisions that 
foster more neoliberalism in the blockchain context ought to be clear, questioned 
and ultimately challenged.
Conclusion
It is clear that ignoring the hype surrounding blockchain is unwise given its rapid 
proliferation. Echoing trends in technologies that have come before it, blockchain 
represents an ‘increasingly influential yet subtle force in our lives’ (Brenner 2007, 
p. 185). Regulators and governments especially need to get a grip on blockchain in 
order to ensure democratic accountability in the blockchain ecosystem and beyond; 
to ask whether the technology and the regulatory goals attached to it are ‘propor-
tionate and limited to what is necessary to protect a specific public interest in a dem-
ocratic society’ (Wright et al. 2006, p. 156). Blockchain is a product of the shifts 
and tensions in political and socio-economic thought and practice since the financial 
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crisis of 2008. As a discourse or text blockchain recounts a broad matrix of socio-
economic and political issues in a constant state of flux. Moreover it is revealing 
something very important about the evolution of the subject caught in the force-field 
of neoliberal economic reason both at the macro level of contemporary free-market 
capitalism, and more intimately. Blockchain further highlights for example: the sub-
ject’s encounter with the (im)materialism of digital objects; big data and the digi-
tal unconscious; as well as the ability of technologies to produce and distort mean-
ing, as well as (re)constitute being and memory. These issues are technologically 
informed social, political, as well as psychological, concerns that deserve serious 
analysis. The consequences of change in communities and the lives of individuals 
who already lack influence over the technologies, networks, platforms and data that 
presently shape, control and yet provide meaning, is key to the unravelling story of 
blockchain. For better or worse, understanding a future with blockchain is impera-
tive. From a critical perspective it may not be all about blockchain (Tapscott and 
Tapscott 2016), but it is certainly the case that blockchain can no longer be ignored.
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